Standing Committee E

[Dame Marion Roe in the Chair]

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords]

Marion Roe: Order. As it is very warm in this Room, hon. Members may remove their jackets. I remind Members that copies of the programme motion are available in the Room and that it supersedes the order of consideration motion on the amendment paper.

Paul Goggins: I beg to move,
 That—
 (1) during proceedings on the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill [Lords] the Standing Committee shall meet on Tuesdays and Thursdays at 9.10 a.m. and 2.30 p.m.;
 (2) 10 sittings shall be allotted to the consideration of the Bill in Committee;
 (3) the proceedings shall be taken in the following order: Clauses 1 to 16, Schedule 1, Clause 17, Schedule 2, Clauses 18 to 20, Schedule 3, Clauses 21 to 24, Schedule 4, Clause 25, Schedule 5, Clauses 26 to 30, Schedule 6, Clauses 31 to 34, Schedules 7 and 8, Clause 35, Schedule 9, Clauses 36 to 39, New Clauses, New Schedules, remaining proceedings on the Bill;
 (4) proceedings on the Bill shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at 6.55 p.m. on Tuesday 6th July 2004.
 It is a pleasure, Dame Marion, to see you in the Chair. I know that I speak on behalf of the Committee in warmly congratulating you on your new title, and we shall learn to address you by it. On a different note personal to you, one of my responsibilities last year was to respond for the Government to the private Member's Bill on female genital mutilation, during which time I learned a lot about your significant contribution on that subject. It will be a pleasure to have you preside over our proceedings. I pay tribute to your work in this field. 
 We had a good Second Reading debate, and I do not intend to rehearse all the arguments now. The Bill deals with a number of important measures, strengthens the law on domestic violence, deals with a variety of new arrangements for victims and introduces a new offence of causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult. We made it clear on Second Reading that the Government intend to overturn four changes made to the Bill in the other place: two relate to the new offence, one relates to unfitness to plead and one relates to multiple offending. Various Members at various times promised us significant debate on those issues. I look forward to that. 
 We have already tabled amendments to bring the rights of victims of mentally disordered offenders in line with the rights of victims of serious offenders. I 
 shall shortly table amendments to bring parallel arrangements for Northern Ireland. Towards the end of last week we tabled an amendment to give the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority authority to recover money from offenders that has been paid in compensation. I have already made an informal commitment, and I make it again formally on the record, that we will soon table other amendments in relation to the victims' element of the Bill. Hon. Members from all parties will look forward to studying them closely. We will also introduce amendments on fine enforcement, which will command the support of the whole Committee. 
 Our discussions so far on the substance of the Bill and the timetabling of our deliberations have been consensual. That should be the spirit of the Committee. We will be flexible. We have already agreed that there may be fewer sittings than planned, or there may be more, but however many sittings there are, we will give the Bill thorough consideration so it goes back to the House in even better shape than it is in this morning. I reiterate that any Committee member can approach members of the Bill team for advice and to consult on and discuss any ideas or questions. We should be entirely open in our consideration of these matters.

Cheryl Gillan: I echo the words of the Minister, Dame Marion. It is delightful to see you in the Chair, particularly as you have such a long track record. It is so nice to be able to call you Dame Marion, not Mrs. Roe, because it has a much better ring to it. The honour is greatly deserved.
 We have pursued the Bill in both Houses in a constructive spirit. There are differences between the shape of the Bill as the Conservatives would like it to be and that which the Minister is proposing. I hope, Dame Marion, that we will not give you and Mr. Benton too much trouble. We are practising grown-up politics: perhaps that is why nobody takes any notice outside this Room and the Chamber. It is rather sad that that should happen when Parliament is doing its best. 
 As you will have noticed, Dame Marion, we are slightly top heavy on the Conservative side of the Opposition Bench. I am delighted that my hon. Friends the Members for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) and for Epping Forest (Mrs. Laing) will join me: we shall be boxing and coxing. 
 As the Minister said, a couple of issues need to be addressed. It has not escaped all our notices that part of the Bill is arriving at a very late stage. The train left the station six months ago in the Lords, and the other place has not had an opportunity to consider many of the Government amendments being put forward. Will the Minister comment on the position of their lordships' House so far as that is concerned and on what will happen when the Bill returns to the upper House? I would also like him to give a definite date for the tabling of the remaining amendments and assurances that they will be the last amendments tabled, other than those that may be negotiated during this Committee stage. The Government may be 
 minded to accept some, because of the powerful arguments of his hon. Friends and of Opposition Members. 
 It is fair to say that we were disappointed that various amendments were produced at such a late stage. It is a pity. I want the Minister's undertaking that should the Committee agree, by consensus, that we need extra time to consider provisions when they come forward, the usual channels will have the negotiations that we have anticipated and will have the power to extend the Committee stage or to arrange for any sitting to sit much later than planned. That aside, I look forward to our deliberations and, as the Minister said, I hope that we can produce a piece of legislation that does justice to the serious subjects that it covers.

David Heath: I, too, welcome you to the Chair, Dame Marion, and I echo the congratulations from both sides on your elevation. Having had the pleasure of serving on a previous Committee under your chairmanship, I know that we can look forward to expeditious consideration of the business and good order throughout. That is exactly what one would expect.
 The Bill is important, but I hope that it does not require us to extend our proceedings unnaturally. We can fully debate the matters before us, and I hope that we will be able to do so within the time allocated. 
 The fact that the Government propose to overturn the improvements made to the Bill in another place gives me cause for concern and deep regret. The Government are wrong, and I look forward to arguing why that is so. Those in another place who amended the Bill did so for the right reason: to make it a better piece of legislation. I have every anticipation that if the Government reverse those changes in this House, the same amendments, or something similar, will return to us at a later stage, and the Bill will be thus delayed. 
 I also have concerns about the late introduction of the proposals now before us. From the sound of the Home Secretary's comments on them, we will welcome them, but, nevertheless, to bring them in at this stage gives cause for concern, not least because it has been suggested that that will require recommittal to another place. That seems unfortunate, because the Bill has brought about a great deal of consensus between the political parties about the right way forward. We welcome it, but we seek to improve it by addition and by resisting the Government's attempts to change what it contains as a result of efforts in another place. I hope that we will make speedy progress.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: On behalf of the usual channels, Dame Marion, I, too, welcome you to the Chair and add my congratulations on your elevation. It is good to hear that you have had that recognition, which is justly deserved.
 The Bill is very important to many of our constituents, and many outside bodies will watch our progress with great interest. If the Bill in any way curbs some of the violence, distress and cruelty prevalent for too many people in this country, we will have done our constituents a great service. 
 I am certain that we will be able to make orderly progress through the Bill. I welcome the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Wythenshawe and Sale, East (Paul Goggins), and pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs. Gillan) for the gracious way in which she opened. I also look forward to working with my hon. Friends the Members for Beaconsfield and for Epping Forest. 
 We oppose programme motions whenever and wherever they occur. Recently, I served on the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill, in which we had, I think, the worst example of programming. Unprecedentedly, we had to come back for a second Standing Committee, during which another huge chunk was inserted into the Bill. Not content with that, the Government then had to insert yet another huge chunk on Report. To my mind, that was unacceptable. 
 Given the consensus in this Committee, I hope that the timetable will be acceptable; I believe that it is, and the usual channels have been accommodating in indicating flexibility, which I welcome. It is unfortunate, however, that, during the passage of a Bill that started in the House of Lords, the Government are going to overturn some key provisions discussed in six House of Lords sittings. Not only that, but they intend to add what may turn out to be completely consensual provisions on victims of crime at this stage of the Bill. For the sake of good order and conduct, it would have been a good idea to have thought about that and put it into the Lords Bill in the first place. 
 Having said that, I do not want to carp or to get the Committee off to a bad start. I look forward to working with you, Dame Marion, and no doubt with the Government, with all good humour and good speed to get this Bill on to the statute book.

Vera Baird: I, too, congratulate you, Dame Marion. You have had a long engagement with this issue, and it is good that you are in the Chair.
 I have tabled new clause 22, which is, at the moment, the tail-ender, and I raise the matter now while we are discussing programming and possible adjustments to it. The new clause was tabled by me alone, and it may therefore easily be regarded as of less than primary importance—[Hon. Members: ''No!'']. I am glad that I said that. 
 The new clause represents the Law Commission's provisional recommendations on the law of manslaughter, and that it why it is important to reach it. It would alter the law of provocation. As currently configured, that law allows men to be acquitted when they kill women in a sudden rush of anger, from relatively small provocation, but it does not allow women to be acquitted of murder when they kill from fear after long abuse. The Law Commission was specifically asked to inquire into that in the hope that it would be ready with proposals, so that we could get them into the Bill. It has reported only provisionally, but I understand that the final recommendations will be very similar, if not identical, to the current ones. Consequently, I tabled the new clause, in the hope that the Government would accept it. If not, I hope that it 
 will be debated as fully as possible, so that it, or a very similar provision, may be accepted in some future Bill at an early stage. I ask those in charge of programming to ensure that that clause will be reached in due course.

Ann Cryer: I add my congratulations, Dame Marion, and those of the all-party group on breast cancer. I am sure that all its members will be delighted by the news.
 Has the Minister taken cognisance of my comments on Second Reading regarding a criminal offence of forcing to marry, or aiding or abetting that? He promised that he would. Will he table a new clause or an amendment along those lines?

Paul Goggins: I can tell the hon. Members for Cotswold (Mr. Clifton-Brown) and for Chesham and Amersham that the reason why the amendments on some of our proposed victim measures have come so late in the day is that we have had consultation on them; they are of interest to the public, and it was important that we got feedback, which is why we were not able to table them before. Now that the consultation is complete and we are clear on policy, we will bring forward the amendments we want to make. I cannot be precise as to the minute when they will be tabled, but I hope that it will happen in the next couple of days, which should give all Committee members time to consider them. I have learned in life, if not as a Minister, never to say never, but I hope they will be all the substantial further amendments that we intend to make. I do not envisage any major or controversial further amendments, although—who knows?—hon. Members may persuade me on one or two issues, and I may need to reconsider and bring further proposals to the Committee or to the House on Report.
 My hon. Friend the Member for Keighley (Mrs. Cryer) mentioned forced marriages. I indicated on Second Reading that the Government were sympathetic to her argument. We are still considering how best that might be done in the Bill, and I will keep her and the Committee up to date with any conclusions that we reach. 
 I want to emphasise that, both here and in the other place, everything will be agreed in the usual way through the usual channels, but we have made it clear that we will be flexible. We will have more or fewer sittings as we need them, and we will ensure that there is ample time for all matters to be discussed, including the issues of provocation raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar (Vera Baird). It is appropriate for the Committee to discuss that; I shall argue strongly that it is not appropriate for us to decide finally on the matter but helpful if we discuss it in detail, and there will be time for that. 
 I will be joined on the Front Bench by the Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley (Mr. Leslie), who will help us with certain matters, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor-General, who also has an honourable track record on these issues. 
 Question put and agreed to.

Marion Roe: I remind the Committee that there is a money resolution in connection with this Bill, copies of which are available in the Room. I also remind members that adequate notice should be given of amendments. As a general rule, I do not intend to call starred amendments, including any that may be reached during an afternoon sitting of the Committee. I also remind members to switch off their mobile telephones.Clause 1 Breach of non-molestation order to be a criminal offence

Clause 1 - Breach of non-molestation order to be a criminal offence

Cheryl Gillan: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in clause 1, page 1, line 6, after 'violence)', insert—
 '(1) In section 42 after paragraph (2)(b) insert—
''(c) if in any family proceedings the court considers that the respondent has been, or is likely to be responsible for an act of domestic violence as defined by section 30A.''.
(2) '.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
 Amendment No. 1, in clause 1, page 1, line 8, leave out 'does anything' and insert 
'commits an act of domestic violence.'. 
New clause 3—Definition of Domestic Violence— 
 Before section 30 in Part 4 of the Family Law Act 1996 (c.27) (Family Homes and Domestic Violence) insert— 
 ''30A Definition of domestic violence 
 (1) In this Act, and in any other family proceedings, 'domestic violence', in relation to any person, means violence against that person by any other person with whom that person is, or has been, in a domestic relationship. 
 (2) In this section, 'violence' means 
 (a) physical abuse; 
 (b) sexual abuse; 
 (c) psychological or emotional abuse, including, but not limited to, 
 (i) intimidation; 
 (ii) harassment; 
 (iii) damage to property; 
 (iv) threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse; 
 (v) in relation to a child, abuse of the kind set out in subsection (3) of this section. 
 (3) Without limiting subsection (2)(c) of this section, a person psychologically abuses a child if that person 
 (a) causes or allows the child to see or hear the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a person with whom the child has a domestic relationship; or 
 (b) puts that child, or allows the child to be put, at real risk of seeing or hearing that abuse occurring; but the person who suffers that abuse is not regarded, for the purposes of this subsection, as having caused or allowed the child to see or hear the abuse, or, as the case may be, as having put the child, or allowed the child to be put, at risk of seeing or hearing the abuse. 
 (4) Without limiting subsection (2) of this section;. 
 (a) a single act may amount to abuse for the purposes of that subsection; 
 (b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may amount to abuse for that purpose, even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial. 
 (5) Behaviour may be psychological abuse for the purposes of subsection (2)(c) of this section which does not involve actual or threatened physical or sexual abuse.''.'. 
 New clause 9—Definition of Domestic Relationship— 
 '(1) For the purposes of this Act, a person is in a domestic relationship with another person, if the person— 
 (a) is a partner of the other person; or 
 (b) is a family member of the other person; or 
 (c) ordinarily shares a household with the other person; or 
 (d) has a close personal relationship with the other person. 
 (2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(c) of this section, a person is not regarded as sharing a household with another person by reason only of the fact that— 
 (a) the person has— 
 (i) a landlord-tenant relationship; or 
 (ii) an employer-employee relationship; or 
 (iii) an employee-employee relationship— 
 with that other person; and 
 (b) they occupy a common dwellinghouse (whether or not other people also occupy that dwellinghouse). 
 (3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(d) of this section, a person is not regarded as having a close personal relationship with another person by reason only of the fact that the person has— 
 (a) an employer-employee relationship; or 
 (b) an employee-employee relationship— 
 with that other person. 
 (4) With limiting the matters to which a Court may have regard in determining, for the purposes of subsection (1)(d) of this section, whether a person has a close personal relationship with another person, the Court must have regard to— 
 (a) the nature and intensity of the relationship, and in particular— 
 (i) the amount of time the persons spend together; 
 (ii) the place or places where that time is ordinarily spent; 
 (iii) the manner in which that time is ordinarily spent;— 
 but it is not necessary for there to be a sexual relationship between the persons: 
 (b) the duration of the relationship.'.

Cheryl Gillan: Amendment No. 14 has been helpfully drafted to enable us to discuss at the start of this first sitting the definition of domestic violence. That topic was raised in the early stages of deliberations in the other place, and I hope that the Committee will bear with me if I reiterate some of the arguments that members have no doubt already had the opportunity to read.
 The Minister is familiar with the large number of outside organisations that back a formal definition. They think it is extraordinary that, despite the fact that domestic violence is the leading subject of the Bill, there is no definition of domestic violence that the Department has agreed or consulted on outside its confines. I understand that the Home Office uses a three-line definition involving any violence between current and former partners in an intimate relationship, wherever and whenever the violence occurs, with the violence including physical, sexual, emotional and financial abuse. 
 I further understand from some organisations that have briefed me on the Bill that a ministerial committee may have adopted a definition of domestic violence for use across all Departments. There was some concern that another definition might have been adopted that has yet to be published, and which has not been subject to any consultation. Therefore, I ask Minister what the latest position is and whether the 
 organisations that have been briefing us are mistaken in their view that there is a new definition that will be commonly used across all Departments. 
 I am particularly grateful to Women's Aid, which has provided briefings on the amendments, and particularly on new clauses 3 and 9. New clause 9 defines domestic relationships. Many people felt that, because such a definition was missing in the other place, Baroness Scotland was not willing to consider it. Whether that is the case remains to be seen; we will learn more when the Minister responds. 
 Women's Aid has the backing of about 200 organisations for the inclusion of a definition of domestic violence. The definition suggested is taken from New Zealand's Domestic Violence Act 1995. It has been endorsed by many organisations dealing with domestic violence, and by the Advisory Board on Family Law's Children Act sub-committee, which said that it was a useful, comprehensive and gender-neutral definition. 
 Why is a definition needed? Some organisations think that the existing definition that the Home Office uses is too narrow. Southall Black Sisters, with which I am sure every Committee member is familiar, says that the Home Office definition is limited to violence between partners and former partners in intimate relationships. Many agencies would like an extended definition to include other members of the family. Although Southall Black Sisters recognises the need to focus on intimate relationships, since partners and ex-partners are the most common group of perpetrators or victims, the definition that the Home Office uses fails to recognise domestic violence perpetrated by other family members. Many black and minority women find that one or more members of the family and the wider community can perpetrate or collude in domestic violence. That is particularly the case where Asian women live in extended families and can be subject to abuse from partners, ex-partners, parents, siblings, uncles, aunts, in-laws and former in-laws, as well as people in the community such as family friends, community leaders and even bounty hunters, private detectives or organised networks of men. 
 The Minister may be familiar with the news this morning that, on the back of a conference being held in The Hague, the Metropolitan police is looking at honour killings and bounty hunters and is examining more than 100 cases of murder in the United Kingdom to see whether there is any linkage. The Minister may want to inform the Committee on the latest position on that, because I know that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee—particularly on the Government Benches—have taken a great deal of interest in the issue and have been very brave in making a stand on it. 
 It is also thought that, by limiting the definition, the Home Office has excluded culturally specific forms of harm such as forced marriage and female genital mutilation. I need go no further because our Chairman is probably the greatest expert in this House on that subject. However, I hope that widening the definition will address some of the issues that Southall Black Sisters in particular has identified as part of the problem. 
 Women's Aid has produced an excellent briefing. I make no apologies to the Committee for taking members through some of the arguments it deploys, particularly because it represents the views of more than 200 organisations that have endorsed the line on which it has taken a lead. Although domestic violence accounts for a quarter of all violent crime, there are many myths and misconceptions about it that result in ineffective outcomes when cases enter the justice system. By the time such cases reach the family courts, when abusive parents apply for contact or residence orders, the risks associated with domestic violence are usually perceived as not very serious. A widespread misconception among legal professionals is that domestic violence stops on separation. However, research shows that women are at higher risk of violence and of being killed after leaving a violent partner. 
 Another common misconception is that domestic violence affects only adults, but nearly three-quarters of children on the child protection register are in cases featuring domestic violence. That reflects the fact that men who abuse their female partners are also likely to abuse their children, and children are often traumatised by witnessing domestic violence. 
 Many legal professionals believe that contact is good for the child, even with a violent parent. For that reason courts have made orders granting unsupervised contact to schedule 1 offenders convicted of offences against children. Last year a survey found that 16 per cent. of refuges in England and Wales knew of local cases in which a contact visit with a violent parent had resulted in a child being significantly harmed since the good practice guidelines were introduced in April 2001. 
 The most commonly asked question with regard to domestic violence is, ''Why doesn't she leave?'' For someone who has not been subjected to psychological abuse, it can be difficult to understand why an abused woman stays in a relationship for years without notifying the police or social services and why some women return to their abusers not once but several times. The court may decide that there are good reasons not to believe allegations of abuse, but in the experience of Women's Aid, women who return to their abusers are often those who have been most psychologically damaged by their experiences. It believes that the amendment will help to dispel those misconceptions because it acknowledges that domestic violence affects children and recognises the significance of psychological and emotional abuse. 
 Domestic violence presents the courts with a serious problem because of the legal principle that he who asserts must prove. Abused women often find it difficult to prove that abuse has taken place because it typically occurs behind closed doors in the family home when no independent witness is present. Even when it is possible to prove that a violent incident took place, the court may decide not take it seriously because it was only one incident or the woman was not seriously injured. In one case, in which the court 
 accepted that the father had attacked the mother when she was holding the child, that was not considered a serious assault, so a contact order was granted. Eventually contact became unsupervised and was enforced with a threat of a penal notice. The father subsequently sexually abused the child. 
 It is vital that the courts should understand the dynamics of abusive relationships so that they can provide appropriate protection for the child. The amendment suggested by Women's Aid, which I have tabled on its behalf, encourages the courts to do that by considering all aspects of the abuse and its effects on the child.

Vera Baird: I do not want to create an unpleasant, contentious atmosphere, but Women's Aid informs me that it asked the Opposition not to table the amendments on its behalf. It briefed Opposition Members about them but wanted them to be tabled by Labour Members because it felt that that would be more advantageous to its arguments. It is very displeasing to Women's Aid, whose members have been on the telephone and have e-mailed me a number of times, that the Tories have, as it were, filched them.

Cheryl Gillan: I am surprised by that, and I am not sure how to respond. I have talked to many people, including Women's Aid, which provided me with a briefing, and I undertook to raise the issues on its behalf. It has not phoned me and asked me not to table the amendments. In fact, the only phone call I received was from the Mayor's office, complaining that I had tabled some amendments belonging to it that were going to be tabled by Labour Members. I undertook to consider that, but said that it would be helpful if we supported those amendments.The hon. and learned Lady is hitting a sour note. I am tabling the amendments honestly and genuinely. If she consults the House of Lords Hansard, she will see that these matters were also raised by my noble Friend Baroness Anelay of St. Johns in another place.

David Heath: Just to correct the record and establish who had ownership, the same amendment was tabled by my noble Friends Baroness Thomas of Walliswood and Lord McNally in another place.

Cheryl Gillan: I was about to say that the original amendments were tabled by the Liberal Democrats in the other place.

Dominic Grieve: I do not think that an amendment is property, although it would be discourteous to table an amendment if someone else had come up with the idea and wished to table it themselves. The hon. and learned Member for Redcar may agree that the purpose of discussion in Committee is to table amendments, even if one does not agree with them entirely, so that they can be considered. That is what my hon. Friend has done.

Cheryl Gillan: I will give way again.

Vera Baird: I would not have raised the issue if the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham had not asserted specifically, in her last sentence before I rose,
 that she had tabled the amendments on behalf of Women's Aid. That is incorrect. The amendments are anybody's, if there is interest in talking about them. None the less, Women's Aid is affronted that the hon. Lady has filched them.

Cheryl Gillan: I had chosen to rise above party political matters on this Bill, and I am disappointed that the hon. and learned Lady, who has worked with me in other instances, has chosen to speak about this. Perhaps I should say on the record that Women's Aid might like to contact me.

Vera Baird: Women's Aid did contact the hon. Lady and indicated its displeasure. It has telephoned and e-mailed me many times yesterday and today; it is upset that this course of action has been proposed and does not want the Government to take against its proposals. The amendment was filched by the Tories. That is unacceptable behaviour. It is absurd to accuse me of bringing party politics into the matter, when the amendments were filched for a party political reason by a party with less of a track record on domestic violence than Labour's. I have made the point. Shall we proceed? The hon. Lady ought to speak to Women's Aid if she does not understand the degree of displeasure that it feels. She is right to say that the office of the Mayor of London is also aggrieved that she has tabled its amendment.

Cheryl Gillan: That gives some insight, into the behaviour not of the Conservatives, but of Labour. I am surprised that the hon. and learned Lady has attacked me. I had no contact with Women's Aid yesterday, although I may have some unread e-mails. I am unaware that it has asked me to withdraw the amendments, and I will continue to pursue them, because it is suitable to discuss the definition of domestic violence at this initial stage. I had hoped that the hon. and learned Lady and several other hon. Members would join in. I made it clear in my opening remarks that the fact that there is no definition in statute was supported by some 200 organisations. Perhaps I tabled the amendment not on behalf of Women's Aid, but on behalf of a number of other organisations, many of which had the opportunity to brief us.

Vera Baird: I am grateful yet again to the hon. Lady for giving way. I hope that this is the last intervention, after which she can get on with her argument. I made a clear point. She has suggested that she is the only person capable of tabling the amendment on behalf of 200 organisations. I tabled all the amendments, but the hon. Lady had tabled them first. That is the problem for Women's Aid, which was most specific as to how it wanted the amendments tabled, and who should do so.
 I have made my point clearly. The hon. Lady should read her e-mails, and she should contact Women's Aid, the Mayor of London and Southall Black Sisters, who are in the same frame of mind about her later amendment, but I will remind her of that when we reach it.

Cheryl Gillan: I am sorry to hear such a sour note from the other side. I assure the Committee that there was no intention to score any political points. It seems to me that the hon. and learned Lady is a little upset because she did not get her amendments in first. She is quite capable of adding her name to any amendments, and if she would like to discuss this matter with me outside, she may be able to tell me which ones she would like to move so that we may be able to row in behind her. For the hon. and learned Lady to make accusations at this stage is wasting time, and what she has said is not the case as I see it.
 The amendment encourages the courts to consider all aspects of abuse and its effects on the child. The next issue is how abusers and domestic violence perpetrators exercise power and control within the family. If legal professionals focus entirely on separate incidents of physical or sexual violence, they will fail to understand the corrosive effects of psychological abuse.

Meg Munn: I chair the all-party Voice group, which represents learning-disabled adults. The organisations that support that group are anxious that learning-disabled adults should be treated within mainstream legislation wherever possible, and I am concerned that the definition does not give credence to the issue that an abuser may not be somebody directly within the family. Has the hon. Lady considered that possibility, or that the abuser may even be a paid carer?

Cheryl Gillan: The hon. Lady makes an excellent point, which she has raised at earlier stages. I hope the Minister will be able to address it, and if she would like to speak to this group of amendments as well, she will be able to make her points directly to him. He is aware of the issues she has raised and probably has some answers to make on the subject.
 In the experience of Women's Aid, domestic violence typically involves a pattern whereby the man waits until the woman is committed to the relationship and then begins to exercise power and control through a wide range of abusive behaviour. He may be incredibly charming and persuasive, as many abusers are. Initially, the abuse may not seem very serious. For example, he may find reasons to prevent her from seeing or contacting any of her friends or relatives; he may be obsessively jealous; he may insist that she accounts for every single penny she has spent; he may check every phone call she has made; he may prevent her from leaving the house; or he may lock her in a room for several hours or days. The violence frequently starts when the woman is pregnant, or soon after the birth of a child. After assaulting the woman, the man may be apologetic, but there is a pattern of violence, increasing in frequency and severity if the relationship continues. That often involves sexual violence. The woman may be repeatedly raped, or forced to take part in pornographic acts. If there are children in the family, they are likely to witness the violence and to be abused themselves. 
 Abuse thrives on secrecy and intimidation. Isolation and humiliation are the strategies perpetrators typically use to ensure that their partners and children do not mention the abuse or try to escape. Abused women often feel ashamed of their situation because they have nobody to turn to for support, or to tell them it is not their fault. They are also likely to be frightened because abusers make terrible threats; for example, the abuser may threaten to kill or injure someone, to commit suicide or to have the children taken into care, if the woman flees from the family home. The threat to phone social services is particularly powerful, because most abused women are terrified that their children will be taken into care. 
 The amendment addresses the dynamics of domestic violence relationships, by defining psychological and emotional abuse and by recognising that a single act, or a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour, may amount to abuse. A legal definition will encourage legal professionals to identify psychological and emotional abuse and to take it seriously. 
 Among issues raised in the other place was the claim that having a definition of domestic violence would fetter judges' discretion and cause problems because of inflexibility. The Children Act sub-committee clearly did not share those concerns. The Crown Prosecution Service has raised concerns that a definition of domestic violence might complicate criminal justice proceedings. However, as the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Bill specifically amends the Family Law Act 1996, that definition would apply only in family law proceedings and would not affect criminal law prosecutions. 
 It has also been claimed that the definition does not cover financial abuse, but including the words ''but not limited to'' in clause 2 would cover that and any other developing features of domestic violence. If we are to deal effectively with domestic violence, we need to recognise the nature and seriousness of the problem. The amendment provides a clear, comprehensive and gender-neutral definition, which is urgently needed to dispel the many misconceptions about domestic violence. The definition will provide a standard basis for decision making with regard to domestic violence cases and civil law cases. It could also provide a standard basis for a national strategic approach to tackling domestic violence, including monitoring and data collection and the development of appropriate policies, guidance and training in all relevant agencies. 
 If anything in the drafting of the amendments could be improved, were the Minister minded to accept them, we would of course accept any alterations that he would make. I have a feeling that he will resist them, but I felt duty bound as I was briefed on them to bring them to the Committee.

Hilton Dawson: I offer my congratulations, Dame Marion, on your deserved honour.
 I support new clauses 3 and 9. In my view, it is essential that we have a statutory definition of domestic violence as well as a definition of a domestic relationship. The definition proposed in new clause 3 is taken almost entirely from the New Zealand legislation, which seems to work extremely well. As has been said, the Children Act sub-committee has commended it as a useful, comprehensive, gender-neutral definition of domestic violence. It is important that we have such a definition to enable the whole of society to take domestic violence much more seriously. Despite the work that Government have done and the cross-party consensus that clearly exists, one has to say that some in our country would yet deny that domestic violence exists and certainly deny that it operates on the scale and intensity and affects the range of people that the definition would seek to include. 
 It is therefore vital that we make it extremely clear that domestic violence exists and make plain the full extent of that appalling phenomenon. We are in a process of cultural change. Not many years ago, certainly within the clear recollection of everyone in the Room, there was no legislation whatsoever on domestic violence. Domestic violence issues were routinely dismissed, by the police and all concerned, as ''just a domestic''. It is a tribute to the people who have generated a policy shift in recent decades that we have made such progress. However, the fact remains that in family proceedings courts—the area to which this definition would address itself—we still come across gross instances in which the legal profession seems to have overlooked entirely the impact of domestic violence on the lives of the most vulnerable in our society—women, yes, but also children. 
 It is appalling that there is clear evidence from Women's Aid of very recent instances of the making of contact orders, and even of residence orders, in favour of men who have perpetrated the most appalling acts of domestic violence, who have been convicted of offences against children and who are schedule 1 offenders, from whom children should be protected. It is vital that we adopt the new clause; it seems incongruous that the Government, apparently, are not yet prepared to take this issue on. 
 To their credit, with the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the Government extended the definition of significant harm to be taken into account when assessing the situations in which children live to include the experience of witnessing domestic violence. They are prepared to extend definitions in that area of the law, so I do not see why they should not be prepared to take on this issue. We have a good Bill, but introducing the definitions would make a good Bill significantly better.

David Heath: I support the amendments and new clauses. I congratulate the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham on amendment No. 14, which has enabled us to debate perhaps the most crucial issue in the Bill at the beginning, rather than at the end. When possible, that always seems a better procedure.
 New clause 3 is identical to the amendment tabled in another place by my noble Friends Baroness Thomas of Walliswood and Lord McNally. That is not to claim 
 any special ownership, I hasten to say; they were simply persuaded by the strength of the arguments for such a definition. I am disappointed that the Government, having correctly taken the view that domestic violence is an extremely serious matter that needs to be given a priority that it does not always enjoy, are resisting defining what they seek to prevent.They do so on the spurious grounds that we know domestic violence when we see it. That is self-evidently not true; as has been said, there are competing definitions of domestic violence, and it is clear that we do not know it when we see it. I reject the argument that says that simply by defining, we restrict application. It is essential to have a correct definition, and we need to bear in mind the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Ms Munn): the definition needs to be comprehensive. 
 It also needs to be of value in three specific areas. It has to be of value to the courts in giving clarity to the interpretation of statute; that is crucial. It needs to give clarity to enable the incidence of the crime to be measured adequately, because otherwise we will have no benchmarks against which to measure progress in deterring acts of domestic violence and assessing whether education programmes, support for families, or any other measures that the Government may wish to introduce, are successful. Thirdly, we need clarity simply so that the man and woman in the street know what domestic violence is and when it is being perpetrated, and particularly so that the victims of it know that they are the victims of a crime and that they should report it, and that proper action can be taken to defend them through the judicial system. For all those reasons, we need a comprehensive definition. 
 My hon. Friend the Member for Romsey (Sandra Gidley) and I have introduced a further new clause—new clause 11. It will be considered later, and I do not intend to pre-empt that discussion now. It also introduces a definition, although it does so in a different context within the Bill. We can return to that debate after we have heard what the Minister has to say today. I must say now, however, that what is workable in the New Zealand context is likely to be workable here because we are dealing with a broadly comparable jurisdiction with a broadly comparable way of doing business. That which has satisfied the legislators in New Zealand is at least worthy of careful consideration in this Committee and in the House. 
 It is important not to limit artificially the scope of the offence because that would allow perpetrators who should be properly dealt with to go free. However, I do not believe that this definition does that. It sensibly encompasses not only obvious areas, but less obvious areas, and ones that have on occasion been open to dispute. For instance, psychological harassment is an area that some people are still concerned about, but I think that it is a very real part of domestic abuse. May I suggest a new manifestation of that, which I do not think has been considered? When the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley made her intervention about those with disabilities, I thought that one of the most cruel forms of abuse is not actually to do anything to 
 somebody with serious disabilities but to decline to do that which is necessary for their well-being, or to make the threat of declining to do that which is necessary by saying, ''No, unless you do what I say, I will not prepare your dinner this evening, or push you in your wheelchair in the way that is necessary,'' or do a number of other things. That is a clear example of domestic abuse in a familial relationship, and yet I am not entirely convinced that it is encompassed within present legislation. 
 For all those reasons—and without rehearsing all the arguments that have been put—I believe that we need a definition. This is a workable definition. It has been proved to be workable from elsewhere. I hope that the Government will give it genuine consideration because, as we have heard, it has support from Members on both sides of the Committee and from a great number of people outside the House who are practitioners in this area, who know what they are talking about and who recognise the current deficiencies. 
 In closing, I want to refer to amendment No. 1, which the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham did not really address. I have concerns about it. Amendment No. 1 leaves out ''does anything'' in line 8 of page 1 and inserts 
''commits an act of domestic violence.'' 
I think that that is a limitation on the application of non-molestation orders—or, at least, it potentially is. I would much prefer the courts to have the freedom to state in a non-molestation order the behaviour that they wish to prevent. I do not want that necessarily to be limited within the strict context of domestic violence. I do not agree with the hon. Lady on that specific point and I hope that she will not press that amendment. However, I must say that I give my wholehearted, general support to the contentions contained in amendment No. 14 and new clauses 3 and 9.

Vera Baird: For all the reasons set out by hon. Members, it is clear that a clear definition of domestic violence is urgent. I will say little more on that, except to add my support to that need. It is clearly important to be able to name and to recognise domestic violence, because we are taking deliberate steps to outlaw it. We must know what we are outlawing and, as has already been said, so must the public. It is also critical that the definition should be wide enough to put into the public domain a recognition of the breadth of abuse that amounts to domestic violence. As Women's Aid's briefings say, that is still frequently misunderstood and there are still arguments that, ''It cannot be so bad because the woman in question does not leave'' and that, ''If she has not got a black eye, it is not domestic violence.'' It is very important that violence is understood in the context of someone who is living at home with their abuser and who has immense emotional and, no doubt, practical and familial ties to that person. Everything needs to be clearly set out in the definition.
 It is also important that there should be a common definition. A huge problem has arisen because there is a multiplicity of definitions. The Home Office has one, 
 as do the police and the Crown Prosecution Service. Those definitions are not the same. How can it be possible to collect data and to monitor the prevalence of such violence, or even how the Bill's impact is curbing it, if we do not have a definition so that we all know what we are talking about? 
 The joint inspectors of the CPS and the police made a recent report about domestic violence. They made the point that although they are working together to consider the way that domestic violence is investigated and prosecuted, the two agencies that they are investigating do not have the same definition of it. Therefore, while the two sets of inspectorates are working together, they are working on different definitions. Clearly, that is pretty silly.

David Heath: I do not want to spring anything on the hon. and learned Lady. However, did she see the comments that were made in another place about the Court of Appeal's decision regarding Lomas v. Parle? That was considered to be relevant to the matter that we are discussing. I do not know whether she is familiar with that case but if she is, does it, as was suggested, reinforce the view that we need a common definition?

Vera Baird: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that prompt. I have read the debate in the other place but I have not looked up the case report of Lomas v. Parle as I had intended to do. I will do that. However, judging by what Lord Campbell of Alloway and others who support him are saying, it appears that the Court of Appeal has suggested that a definition is urgent.
 One must congratulate Women's Aid, not only on getting lots of support for this definition but on consulting over a substantial period to work out the right kind of definition. I think that it meets all the things that Committee members have said are important in a definition. My guess is that the Minister does not disagree that it is important to have one and that the only question that he would raise is whether there is a problem about putting it into statute. I do not know whether there is one, and he will no doubt set that out. 
 I will turn, as the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath) did, to amendment No. 1, which was tabled by Tory members of the Committee. Frankly, I do not know how much it can be relied upon, because it may just be a device to ensure that the debate comes at the front of our considerations. If that is the case, it is a sensible device. However, there are problems with it. Clause 1(1) simply states: 
 ''A person who without reasonable excuse does anything that he is prohibited from doing by a non-molestation order is guilty of an offence.'' 
The amendment would remove ''does anything'' and would include 
''commits an act of domestic violence.''
 There is the problem that the hon. Gentleman has just mentioned; the amendment narrows the impact of making a non-molestation order a criminal offence. Non-molestation orders come about because a judge 
 hears evidence of what the culprit has been doing which has led to the application and then determines what that person is likely to do again and what they should be banned from doing. 
 Those orders can have a lot of breadth, and it is important to allow them to have maximum breadth. We do not want that adjudication of what has been going on and what should be stopped to be able to be breached with impunity. If an extra layer of definition is added requiring that whatever the person has done comes into the ambit of domestic violence, that will have a narrowing effect. For instance, although the current definition of domestic violence is good—I am being critical not of the definition but of the amendment—it would be hard pressed to include some commonplace things. An individual might not phone his partner himself to harass her, but he might get someone else to do it, such as his brother or workmate or another member of his family. That is probably not an act of domestic violence in the terms of this definition, but if the injunction were against him doing anything to harass her either by himself or through his servants or agents, which is usual, getting the brother, workmate or family member to phone would be a breach, and that would be right. That is an example of how including the requirement that there is an act of domestic violence to justify the offence of breach would have a narrowing effect. 
 I have another objection to the amendment. If one changes the phrase to ''A person who without reasonable excuse commits an act of domestic violence'', one envisages what I do not want to be envisaged publicly at all, which is that there can be a reasonable excuse for domestic violence. There may be a reasonable excuse for a breach of a non-molestation order. If the order states that the subject of the order must not telephone or get anyone else to do so, and he arranges for another person to phone because, for instance, he has heard that a child has been injured at school, that would be a breach of the non-molestation order, but it would be a very technical one and it would be understandable, so he would have a reasonable excuse. 
 However, if one once makes a definition of what is a breach and an act of domestic violence and then allows someone to have a reasonable excuse for committing an act of domestic violence, that will fundamentally undermine what we are intending to take a stand on in this Bill, which is to make it absolutely clear that domestic violence is wholly unacceptable in any circumstances. The amendment would embroil courts; men would say, ''Well, I thumped her because she taunted me,'' or ''I thumped her because she nagged me'' or give some other reason that is a reasonable excuse. 
 I am not sure how keen the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham is on the amendment, or whether it is just a device. However, if she is keen on it, I hope that she will be persuaded to withdraw it after hearing what has been said.

Dominic Grieve: I listened with care and interest to what the hon. and learned Lady had to say. Without wishing to reopen old wounds, it seems to me that she has been
 able to make an important contribution to the debate, notwithstanding the fact that she did not move the amendment.
 When I first read the amendments, I was attracted to them because I have had some anxieties about the manner in which the Government have proceeded. They have, in a sense, taken a short cut by simply criminalising breach of non-molestation orders. That is certainly one simple way to approach the problem, but it raises a number of difficult issues, in particular because the scope of a non-molestation order extends way beyond what a person in the street would regard as domestic violence. It covers behaviour that needs to be stopped, but which should be seen in the context of the break-up of relationships. 
 I can draw on my experience of practising in the courts. My pupil master said to me when I first went round the courts with him, ''You've got to understand, Dominic, that while a relationship is breaking up one of the parties is usually very close to a state of insanity.'' My subsequent experience of such cases has persuaded me that that assertion was largely correct. There are huge amounts of emotion involved on one or both sides, and irrationality is one of the hallmarks of such situations. Non-molestation orders exist to curb and restrain that type of behaviour, even when the judge can see that, given a proper cooling-off period, sanity will be restored. On the other hand, those who breach the orders have to be dealt with. However, there are often differences of nature and quality; the orders cover a wide range of potential behaviour, ranging from violence, which any person would regard as completely unacceptable, to behaviour that, although unacceptable, tends to have a pretty pathetic origin but still requires curbing. 
 The Government have taken a short cut, an easy approach. I do not criticise that. The alternative is proposed in the amendments, which attempt to achieve an all-encompassing definition of domestic violence that goes beyond violence, covering, for example, psychological violence. If violence is normally defined as the application of physical force against another person, the definition clearly goes way outside it. I think that ''violence'' may be the wrong word in that context; ''abuse'' might be better. 
 I do not know which of the two approaches is best. I am conscious of having so gone far down the road of the Government's approach—simply criminalising the breach of non-molestation orders—that at this stage it might be difficult to convert the Bill into something wholly different. As the hon. and learned Member for Redcar rightly highlighted, and as has also been highlighted in the perfectly justified critique of amendment No. 1, once we start saying that there is a separate thing called domestic violence or domestic abuse, we face the problem of, for instance, imposing blanket penalties—as clause 1 would—that do not distinguish between the different sorts of behaviour. I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says. I fear that it may be too late in the day to try to bring about the reversal sought by the hon. and learned Lady, which the amendments raise for discussion. I will be 
 interested to hear from the Minister about the New Zealand experience and whether it has proved workable in the common law context. 
 Those are the reasons for tabling the amendments. I am sorry that the hon. and learned Lady is so angered that they were tabled by the Opposition: they were tabled simply so that the Committee could have a general discussion on a subject that we were approaching in a completely non-confrontational manner.

Vera Baird: I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman deliberately misunderstands me. I have no quarrel with him. I want to make clear that the issue is less to do with ownership than with the preference of those who have worked enormously hard and who see the amendments as their best shot to get what they want into the Bill. Their tactical preference was that the amendments come from the Government side. That is the issue, not ownership. I hope that that is clear.

Dominic Grieve: I can speak only for myself. I have had no approach whatsoever from anybody indicating disapproval of the fact that the official Opposition tabled the amendments. If I had, or if the hon. and learned Lady had approached me to say that she was displeased, I would have discussed that with my hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham. My hon. Friend has told the Committee that she received no such approach, and I hope that the hon. and learned Lady accepts that. I did not go into my office this morning, so it is possible that an e-mail that I have not seen is waiting on my desk. However, I hope that she accepts the assurances given by Conservative Members that no communication has been brought to our notice saying that those who originally proposed the amendments for consideration did not desire us to table them. The amendments were tabled last week, and although other people could have added their names or we could have withdrawn them, they were there long before any such communication could have been received.

Vera Baird: The awareness that the amendments had been tabled came from my private meeting with the Minister last Wednesday or Thursday, when the blue version was published. That was when Southall Black Sisters realised that the Conservatives had tabled the amendments, and they responded as I have described. At that time, the representative of Women's Aid, who also attended the meeting, realised that that was so and responded as I have described. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham has conceded that she had a phone call from the Mayor of London. That is the third representative organisation that hoped that the amendments would be tabled by a Government Member. Those organisations are confident that they made their intentions clear. I understand that the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has had no connection with those groups, so I do not include him in my comments. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham has made it clear to me that they did not make their intentions clear—that is really what she is saying—and I can do no other than accept
 that. I would not have intervened had she not turned the phrase and suggested that she was presenting the amendments on behalf of Women's Aid, even though that was not that organisation's position. I understood that she knew that Women's Aid that that was not their position. As I have said—I close on this point because I appreciate this is an intervention—the amendments are the organisations' best shot to achieve things for which they have campaigned for a long time, and it should have been left to them to decide the tactical way to put them forward.

Dominic Grieve: I hear what the hon. and learned Lady says, but she will be aware, because we have served on many Bill Committees together, that large numbers of amendments are sent to hon. Members for consideration—usually with an accompanying request that they be considered. I remember seeing the amendments, because they were communicated to me. I was therefore under the impression that hon. Members were being asked to consider them. The way to bring proposed amendments before a Committee is to table them, which we did.

Julie Morgan: I, too, congratulate you on your elevation, Dame Marion.
 I rise to express my support for the inclusion of a definition of domestic violence and congratulate Women's Aid on all the work that it has done and pm its briefings. The proposal has the support of Welsh Women's Aid, which also feels strongly that there should be definition. Many hon. Members have said that there has been a big change of attitude among the professionals—in Cardiff, the attitudes of the police have been transformed—but there is still a long way to go among the public. That was brought home to me personally by a discussion with a group of young women in south Wales, during which I was shocked to hear what they felt it was acceptable to put up with. We need a clear definition of domestic violence so that the public is aware of what is and is not acceptable behaviour. I urge the Government during the passage of the Bill to find some way to include such a definition.

Paul Goggins: As hon. Members have already indicated, the amendments would insert into Family Law Act 1996 definitions of domestic violence and domestic relationship—

Cheryl Gillan: Will the Minister give way?

Paul Goggins: Perhaps the hon. Lady will allow me to finish my first sentence, which ends: and apply those definitions to the making of non-molestation orders and the criminalisation of their breach.

Cheryl Gillan: I should like the Minister to confirm that it does not matter whose name appears first above any amendment, that he will be even-handed and will not give preference to amendments tabled by Government Members over those tabled by Opposition Members, that his responses are based on his view of the Bill, and that the fact that the
 amendments stand in my name will make no difference to his response. I seek that assurance on behalf all the organisations that have put in so much work.

Paul Goggins: I was just about to comment on some unexpected tensions that arose in our discussions this morning. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham paid tribute to outside organisations: she mentioned Women's Aid and said that 200 other organisations are associated with the concerns that it had raised. It is not for me to comment on who tables amendments; my job is to concentrate on the arguments and on why the Government might not wish to accept the amendments. However, it is important that amendments are tabled and that we have the opportunity to debate the issues. I look forward to other amendments that will be tabled, some by my hon. Friend and others by Opposition Members. I give the Committee the assurance that I will always respond to the substance of amendments and that I will always acknowledge the important contribution that outside organisations make to our debates. They do so based on huge experience. Members of Parliament, not only members of this Committee, have long-standing relationships with many of them that bear fruit in many ways, not least in terms of legislation. I pay tribute to all hon. Friends and Opposition Members who have formed those relationships and who bring the fruits to bear in our discussions. I hope that that is a sufficient response.
 There is no dispute about the need for an adequate working definition of domestic violence. There is more openness about the issue now. My hon. Friend the Member for Lancaster and Wyre (Mr. Dawson) acknowledged the greater openness and the increased recognition of domestic violence and its dreadful impact on individuals and on families. On Second Reading and elsewhere the Government have acknowledged concerns about the different definitions of domestic violence that are applied by different agencies. The Government have been working towards a single definition under the guidance of the ministerial group on domestic violence. The hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham read into the record a definition that the Home Office uses. Other agencies use other definitions, and it is important that we strive for one. We believe that we have almost reached the point of adopting a single, practical definition of domestic violence—one that is used by the Association of Chief Police Officers. It might be helpful if I read out that definition of domestic violence as 
 ''Any incident of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality.'' 
We arrived at that working definition as a result of our consultations on ''Safety and Justice''. All the key agencies were involved in consultation about that definition. We are moving towards the kind of practical definition that we all want.

Sally Keeble: I gather that the amendment will not be accepted. Will my hon. Friend say whether the guidance issued under
 the Bill to local authorities and other agencies that are involved in dealing with domestic violence will tell them to look at the definition that he has given, which the police formulated, and advise on how to implement it? In that way, the definition that he has provided might have some practical effect, even if the Government will not accept its being in the Bill. If he cannot give a detailed explanation now, will he do so in writing?

Paul Goggins: My hon. Friend's suggestion that I write to Committee members with the definition of domestic violence that I have just put on the record and with a detailed outline of how we intend to roll out the definition in practice is a good one. There will be new guidance. There will be a whole series of documents that convey that practical definition to the organisations to which she referred so that it can be shared across the country.

Sally Keeble: I am not sure whether it will be the Home Office or the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister that issues the guidance. However, if people are to be accepted as victims of domestic violence, it is crucial that what has happened to them is recognised as such by the local authorities involved in providing housing and advice services. The authorities therefore need a full definition. Victims of domestic violence, whether they come from gay or unmarried couples, must be provided with support, assistance and rehousing, and be regarded as homeless under homelessness legislation. I suspect that is my hon. Friend's intention, and what everybody on this Committee wants to happen.

Paul Goggins: I am not in a position to comment specifically on any interplay with homelessness legislation, but I accept my hon. Friend's point about the need for all Government departments to share a common definition, and then to get that definition out to the organisations that relate to each department. The ODPM relates to local government, the Department of Health to primary care trusts and hospital trusts, the Home Office to the police, and so on. The work of my noble Friend Baroness Scotland, who chairs the ministerial group on domestic violence, is engaged in precisely that task. I will respond in more detail on the assurances my hon. Friend seeks on both the definition and the process of rolling out use of the definition across the country.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: My hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham and the hon. Member for Northampton, North (Ms Keeble) have talked about the importance of all the agencies in the domestic violence field understanding precisely what they are dealing with. Although we have not reached that part of the Bill, will the Minister consider adopting the definition that he has just given, which seems admirable, in respect of the code in part 3 for victims of violence?

Paul Goggins: I will consider adopting the definition, but I do not want to give the hon. Gentleman too much encouragement, for the reasons I shall give now connected with the difficulties of adopting such a definition in statute.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: The point of my mentioning the code is that it has to be consulted upon; it can therefore be altered, and then it has to be laid before Parliament in a statutory instrument. The code is not as set in concrete as primary legislation is, so it seems an ideal part of the Bill to use that definition.

Paul Goggins: That is why I said I would consider it. I will give the issue generous and serious consideration to see whether adopting that definition is possible, but I do not want to offer false hope—I must have an opportunity to look at the matter in slightly more detail.
 As I made clear on Second Reading, our concern is that if we attempt to define what we believe constitutes domestic violence, however brilliantly we may feel we have done so, it will be difficult to arrive at a tight definition that none the less encompasses the breadth of what domestic violence might be. It is also difficult to keep definitions up to date; they need to be revised from time to time. We do not want to create a loophole on the face of the Bill through which people can escape. We want to ensure that all the groups involved receive the support and action on their behalf that they merit. 
 The amendments are also unnecessary in the context of the Family Law Act 1996, as that legislation does not use the term ''domestic violence''.

Dominic Grieve: The term ''domestic violence'' does not exist, except as bandied about by politicians. That is the nub of the issue, and why I accepted from the outset that the Government had taken a perfectly pragmatic short-cut approach to dealing with domestic violence by making breach of a non-molestation order a criminal offence. Will the Minister accept that there is an alternative approach, which is to define ''domestic violence'' and then to set about trying to stop it by imposing single or varying penalties for it?

Paul Goggins: Different approaches could be taken. I am trying to explain why we have taken the line that we have. At present two conditions apply: first, that parties must be associated, according to the definitions in section 62 of the 1996 Act, and secondly, that there must be evidence of molestation. Case law—other hon. Members will have studied that more than I have had the opportunity to do—indicates that a wide range of behaviours may be classified as molestation for that purpose. For example, in the 1973 case of Vaughan v. Vaughan, molestation is defined as ''pester''. In the 1979 case of Davis v. Johnson, it is defined as conduct that does not amount to violent behaviour. In the 1992 case of Burnett v. George, it is classified as repeated telephoning. A broad range of conduct is therefore captured by the term ''molestation''.

David Heath: I understand what Minister is saying: the flexibility of relying on case law has its attractions. Nevertheless, the vagueness of the term ''molestation'' means that it is open to a court not to accept something within the term that perhaps should be. That is the beauty of having a definition incorporated within the legislation.

Paul Goggins: I have already explained the drawbacks of including a definition in the legislation: it might exclude certain people. The beauty of developing case law over time is that it adds some breadth to the definition of molestation, which in the end can add protection for vulnerable people, which is what we seek to provide.
 Making eligibility for an order further dependent on establishing some history of domestic violence as defined in the amendments would risk reducing the availability of orders to those who need protection. For similar reasons, it is possible that amendment No. 1 would reduce the protection offered to victims of domestic violence by the proposal in clause 1 to criminalise the breach of non-molestation orders. The terms of non-molestation orders can be wide ranging, as I have just indicated. Under section 42 of the 1996 Act they may refer to molestation in general, to particular acts of molestation, or to both. Clause 1 makes the breach of anything prohibited by the order a criminal offence so as to offer the maximum protection to victims and underline the seriousness of the order. To change that to cover only breaches that are acts of domestic violence as defined in new clause 3 would limit that protection. It would also leave the police uncertain about whether a breach had been committed, because they would have to make a judgment on whether the breach was as a result of an act of domestic violence, whereas under clause 1 as currently drafted any breach would be an offence. 
 Although it has not been specifically mentioned this morning, some outside the House have voiced concern that criminalising breaches of non-molestation orders might affect the standard of proof to be applied in the making of the order. I want to make it clear that in criminalising the breach of non-molestation orders it is not the Government's intention to affect the law in respect of the making of such orders, in particular the standard of proof required for the courts to grant orders. 
 Amendment No. 14 would introduce a new power for the courts to make any order in family proceedings if the respondent has been or is likely to be responsible for an act of domestic violence as defined by new clause 3. Section 42(2)(a) and (b) of the Family Law Act already gives the court wide-ranging powers to make orders in family proceedings even though no application has been made. While I acknowledge the intention of the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham, the addition of amendment No. 14 would add nothing to the courts' existing powers. 
 New clause 9 seeks to define a domestic relationship. Section 63(1) of the 1996 Act already lists the associated persons who are entitled to apply for orders under that Act. The new clause may conflict with it. Seeking to define relationships may serve only to 
 create a more complex legal framework that is unlikely to benefit the victim. The current law is clear and concise about the categories of person covered by the Act and we believe that it works. 
 Finally, the hon. Member for Chesham and Amersham referred to a conference taking place this morning. I had a private word with my hon. Friend the Member for Keighley. I only know what anyone would know from media reports about it, but I shall look into the details and if there are issues relevant to our deliberations, I shall make them known to other members of the Committee.

Cheryl Gillan: I thank the Minister for responding to the group of amendments as he did. There is no dispute that recognition of domestic violence is needed. The group of amendments was tabled as a device to bring the issue to the forefront and to enable us to have this debate, because many organisations feel that a definition is necessary. I know that the Minister is aware of that, as we have held meetings together with outside organisations.
 I am pleased to hear that the ministerial group is nearing a conclusion, and I am grateful to the Minister for reading out the definition that ACPO uses, and to hear that he will consider putting that definition into the code in response to the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cotswold. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will let us know his thinking on that subject and tell us what guidance may be necessary. 
 Domestic violence takes many forms. What might at first appear to be an act of great kindness or of reconciliation, such as leaving flowers on the doorstep, might in fact be a threat, whereby the perpetrator of the violence is saying to the victim, ''I am watching you.'' I appreciate that a broad swathe of behaviours has to be taken into consideration. 
 I hope that the organisations that have been pressing the need for a domestic violence definition in statute will have heard what the Minister said, because there is some concern that such a definition could reduce the protection that is currently afforded by restricting the concept of molestation.

Geoffrey Clifton-Brown: Does my hon. Friend not think that one of the defences that the Minister used against putting that definition in the code, namely, that a particular offence might be omitted, is in fact reduced if the definition is put in the code? The code is just that—a code; it can easily be altered by statutory instrument to accord with custom and practice. If a series of omissions leads to people who have committed offences getting off, the definition in the code could easily be altered. Therefore, the code—rather than the Bill—is an ideal place to put it.

Cheryl Gillan: My hon. Friend's points stand on their own. The Minister has heard them, and I expect that he will return to them at a later stage and tell the Committee what he thinks.
 I have had assurances, and I have now heard that there is a working definition that people will be able to look at. I look forward to reading that definition in full, as opposed to just hearing it across the Floor of 
 the Committee, and to learning the response of the organisations that have raised this matter—or allowed us to raise it in the Committee. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, leave out 'existence' and insert 'terms'.

Marion Roe: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 78, in clause 1, page 2, line 1, leave out 'existence' and insert 'content'.
 No. 26, in schedule 7, page 41, leave out lines 14 to 16 and insert— 
 '''(4A) A court considering whether to make an occupation order shall also consider whether to exercise the power conferred by subsection (2)(b) and, whenever violence has been used or threatened, or where there is a risk of significant harm to the applicant or any relevant child, must use the power conferred by subsection (2)(b) to make a non-molestation order.''.'. 
No. 17, in schedule 7, page 41, line 14, leave out from 'shall' to end of line 16 and insert 
'use the power conferred by subsection (2)(b) to make a non-molestation order, whenever violence has been used or threatened, or where there is a risk of significant harm to the applicant or any relevant child'.

Dominic Grieve: The amendments are about, first, the question of what level of proof will be required to criminalise the breach of a non-molestation order. I will take as my starting point the comment that the Minister rightly made in reply to the earlier debate, that non-molestation orders may be general or they may be very particular. They may impose a blanket prohibition on the molestation of another party, or they may lay down specific rules about what a person may or may not do. The other feature is that they may be granted as an emergency ex parte or they may be granted inter partes with the person present in court when the order is made. The Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, there has been no attempt to distinguish between those two sorts of orders in proposed new section 42A.
 I do not disagree with the Government's intention, which is to provide a mechanism to prevent domestic violence and the sometimes appalling behaviour that may be attendant upon it, even if it does not amount to physical violence, by criminalising it—by saying that if a person breaches the terms of an order he can not only be brought back before the judge for sanction or, under certain conditions in the past, there can be power of arrest and he can be brought back before the judge, but he can be immediately arrested by the police, taken to the police station, and charged then and there with the offence of breach of an earlier order, such that he might never appear again in front of the judge who granted the original order. I am not completely clear about how the mechanisms would work in practice. The person might be kept in custody and subsequently dealt with before the magistrates and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, or he might be tried on indictment at the Crown court. I would be interested to hear from the Minister about the relationship between those proceedings. 
 In the circumstances, we as a Committee must remember that even those who transgress have rights. That very important principle is well enshrined in our law. Even villains have rights, although sometimes those rights may be removed. Therefore, I have an anxiety about how the measure will work in practice. Let me state a case simply for the purpose of argument. If a person against whom a non-molestation injunction has been granted in quite defined terms—perhaps ex parte; that would be surprising, but it is possible—breaches the injunction knowing that there is an order but believing that what he is doing remains acceptable, is it possible that that person would not be brought back before the judge to explain himself, as would have happened in the past, but would end up on a criminal charge? On that basis, as I read the Bill, he would have no defence. Persuasive mitigation might be offered after conviction as to the circumstances in which he came to breach the order; nevertheless, he would be saddled with a criminal conviction. 
 As I said, I am slightly anxious about the interplay between the different forces of law and order that will be involved in the process, for example, between the judge in the case—at present, a civil judge who handles the entire matter and can take a view in the round as to whether the breach is technical—and the police, who may for perfectly legitimate reasons of their own decide that they want to come down heavily on an individual and pass the papers up to the Crown Prosecution Service, which might say that a clear breach has occurred and that prosecution should follow. The results of trivial matters could leave people—at the end of a period of marital breakdown, for instance—saddled with an undeserved criminal conviction. Equally, however, I am perfectly alive to the fact that many breaches of non-molestation orders are horrific and flagrant violations of court orders and involve appalling behaviour. I feel wholly comfortable with the idea that persons committing such offences should be prosecuted and, if convicted, sent to prison, arguably for a considerable period. We shall come later to the length of sentences. 
 The first two amendments relate to whether the words ''existence of the order'' on their own are enough, or whether we should use some other definition. Two obvious alternatives are ''terms of the order'' or ''content of the order.'' I shall be interested in the Minister's response to that. I am aware that it will be suggested that the amendments could dilute the impact of orders and create a further hurdle for the prosecution in proving a case; that would be a problem. I am not seeking to provide loopholes by which undeserving defendants should get off. However, as we know so well from other discussions in Committee, one of the problems with the law is that if one moves in one direction, there are often difficulties waiting at the other end. I foresee such difficulties, which is why I would be particularly interested if the Minister can provide some background explanation of how he envisages the provision working in practice. 
 For instance, what criteria apply in a case of a person who breaches an order to determine whether he goes back before the judge in the civil jurisdiction, which is clearly contemplated, or is prosecuted? Will there be guidelines on which sort of case should be handled in a particular way, or will there be a free-for all, in which the decision is left largely to the discretion of the police? The reality is that if a person breaches an order, or is believed to have breached an order, which is seen to be a criminal offence, those most likely to intervene immediately are the police. They will be telephoned and told, ''The order is being breached''. They will turn up in their car and, if the person is lurking around the property when he was not supposed to be within 250 yards of it, arrest him. Once that process starts, it seems unlikely that the civil courts will be seized of that matter again or the judge able to look at what has happened. 
 I see that as a potential problem and I tabled the amendments to enable the Committee to have a discussion. They are probing amendments, but I believe that there is a real issue here about practicality. As the Minister rightly said, non-molestation orders are not necessarily cast in general terms.

Vera Baird: Is the hon. Gentleman clear—I thought that I was and I still think I am, but I am asking him anyway—that there is no exclusion of the power to bring an offender back to the county court instead of taking him to the criminal court? I have received a briefing, which the hon. Gentleman may have received, from a district judge who fears that the proposals in the Bill exclude that power. He fears that when there is an arrest, the case can only go down a criminal route, whereas now it would go into the civil court. Is it the hon. Gentleman's understanding that both routes will be available once the Bill is passed, or that the one that works now will have gone completely?

Dominic Grieve: That raises a subject that has troubled me. It seemed to me when I read the text that there was no exclusion. On the other hand, in practical terms, if somebody breaches an order and the police turn up and arrest him, why should there be any reason for the matter to come back before the judge in the civil jurisdiction? After all, the person who is likely to take it back before the judge in the civil jurisdiction is the victim. If the person who is alleged to have breached the order is in police custody and the police are charging him that evening and bringing him before the magistrates the following morning, why should there be any necessity to return? Could the defenders want to go back before the judge for clarification of the order? At that point the situation is very muddled, but I do not see that happening. The practical impact of the provision is that, in nine cases out of 10, once a civil judge has made an order, no case of breach will come back before his court. There may be exceptions—the hon. and learned Lady may be able to think of some. One might be able to envisage some in theory, but in practice I doubt that they will occur. That is why I
 assume that the district judge to whom she was speaking took the view that in reality the civil court's jurisdiction would go, but that is not how I read the text.

Vera Baird: I respectfully agree with the hon. Gentleman. I do not believe that there is an ouster either, and probably the district judge was talking about practicalities. I am much more worried about the proposition if the civil route is not left, because I am aware of women who do not want to criminalise their partner but want the trouble to stop none the less, so they prefer to go back to the county court. I hope that we are both right and that both routes remain open.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. and learned Lady, because that is an important point. It brings me back to my earlier point, the unfortunate fact that in domestic violence situations there may be horrible people with a propensity for violence and a record of harassment and physical and emotional abuse against a partner. Equally, in many cases non-molestation orders are given because two perfectly decent people have fallen out in their personal relationships and one—sometimes both—is behaving in an irrational manner. The court has to intervene to protect them from themselves and to prevent them doing something that they will later regret. As the hon. and learned Lady said, in those circumstances a decision by one partner not to want the other to be criminalised is legitimate and reasonable, if it is not taken out of fear, for example. That is something we must have regard to. The partner could say, ''I'm quite happy to go back to court under the civil proceedings, but I refuse to co-operate with the police in respect of the breach of the order.'' On the other hand, that may not help. If the police have turned up and seen a technical breach with their own eyes, they will not need the evidence or co-operation of a partner. That is a legitimate intention behind the Bill—to ensure that orders are not breached. I see a difficult area that the Committee needs to consider.

David Heath: The hon. and learned Member for Redcar has put her finger on precisely the difficulty. The purpose of the legislation is surely to usurp the victim's discretion as to whether the civil or the criminal route is the appropriate one in the circumstances, and to put the decision in the state's hands. There are laudable reasons why that might sometimes be the right way of doing it, but one cannot disguise the fact that that is what is being done.

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. Gentleman but will not labour the point now. Other Committee members might want to participate and I will be interested to hear the Minister's response.
 I tabled the other two amendments in the group, but find myself almost compelled to argue against them, even though they are worthy of consideration. They would, in effect, make a non-molestation order automatically linked to an ouster injunction. If one ousted, one would have a non-molestation order. Some argue that that is important, because 
 molestation often accompanies the breach of an ouster injunction. I cannot escape the difficulty—other Committee members might be able to—that while the use of ouster injunctions is often justified, they are frequently used as a weapon, quite unjustifiably, in the context of the break-up of a relationship, as the first step in a scene of open warfare. If a non-molestation order is the automatic consequence of the ouster injunction, it will be a more powerful weapon, because no further independent consideration would be given to the issue. While I understand the motives of those who proposed the amendments, which I was happy to put to the Committee, I listened to the Minister's response and those of other hon. Members and I see serious flaws in the proposals as they stand at present.

David Heath: I am pleased that the hon. Gentleman couched his remarks as he did, because I share his reservations, although I see the value in tabling the amendments. The latter two were proposed by my noble Friends in another place and were argued vigorously there. I also accept much of the reply of the Minister in another place; I understand the points made in rebuttal. However, it is worth our having this debate in this Committee, because there are genuine concerns about the parallel civil and criminal court jurisdiction in the area that we are discussing.
 Some would argue much more strongly than I intend to today that the proposal to criminalise breach of an order will not serve a useful purpose, because there is already capacity in the civil court process to address the problem. Indeed, it might have perverse effect of making it more difficult to deal properly with such cases, in part because the criminal process is almost inevitably a slower and more ponderous one than civil court redress. Although I understand those concerns, I also understand why the Minister is tabling his proposals. I am not arguing against them; I am simply accepting that there is a genuine argument among those who want to see the most effective remedy for domestic violence and for breaches of non-molestation orders, and those who believe that there is a perfectly proper argument that criminalisation is not the right way to go about it. 
 11 am 
 A further issue, which I mentioned during an intervention on the hon. and learned Member for Redcar, is the Lomas v. Parle judgment, which draws attention to the inadequacies that already exist in the interplay between the court systems in this important area. This Bill has the potential, at least, to make those worse. 
 I do not want to repeat arguments already made by the hon. Member for Beaconsfield. I am slightly more dubious than he sounded about amendment No. 2. The idea that somebody was aware of the existence of an order, but did not know what it said is almost an invitation for an argument; the difficulties of proving that would be very substantial. 
 Will the Minister reinforce what his noble Friend Baroness Scotland of Asthal said on the twin approach in another place? She said:
 ''Nothing in the proposals seeks to expunge the role of the civil court through the county court. Nothing in them would limit or prohibit a person going through the civil route, if they were minded so to do.''—[Official Report, House of Lords, 19 January 2004; Vol. 656, c. GC236.]

Vera Baird: Was the noble Lady referring to ousting the civil route completely? Was she talking about the position of somebody being arrested and still having the civil route available, or about the position of a person attacked after an injunction has been obtained still having the ability to use the civil route by applying to the court the following morning for an arrest warrant? Is the hon. Gentleman clear about which she means?

David Heath: I am not clear, but I hope that the Minister is. I address the hon. and learned Lady's intervention to the Minister; clarity in this area is important. Although I hear the words saying that both routes are still available, I see the reality as being that the civil process has effectively been trumped by the criminal process, which by its nature is slower and more difficult. That may put victims and perpetrators in difficulty, because there may be unwillingness on the part of both parties to see the action in question criminalised. As I say, that discretion has been taken away and put, in effect, into the hands of the prosecuting authorities. I see arguments as to why that would be absolutely right on occasions. I hope that the Minister will help on that issue.
 It is not appropriate to speak to a new clause that has not been selected, and I do not intend to do so, but I hope that I can simply refer to new clause 17, on the register of orders. It is entirely relevant. Unless the police officer knows what orders are extant, he cannot take appropriate action. When that was explored in the context of these amendments in another place, it was suggested that each police force needed to maintain a register of orders made by the courts that was accessible to a constable, so that he or she could take appropriate action. 
 I was interested in the Minister's reply, because it suggested that it was intended that there should be a national register. Perhaps he can tell us what progress he has made on a national register, how it will be implemented, whose responsibility it will be and what is its scope, because all that is important to our understanding of how the orders are effectively to be brought before a criminal court. 
 These are important issues about the responsibilities, which do not compete, but overlap, in two areas of jurisdiction in the criminal and the civil courts. I am not wedded to the amendments, unlike the hon. Member for Beaconsfield who tabled them. It was for that reason that we did not proceed with the amendments that we tabled at an early stage of proceedings in another place. Clarity is essential to proper understanding. 
 Again, returning to my previous intervention, the conclusion from the judgment in Lomas v. Parle was that there was a need for an integrated court proceeding. This measure is not the legislative vehicle that could bring about that change, but is that in the Government's thoughts? Does the Minister believe 
 that we will, in future, have single port of call for the people involved, where proper redress can be obtained by either route before a single hearing? If that were possible, would it commend itself to Ministers? If it were not, how would he respond to the trenchant criticisms made of the current process by the judge in Lomas v. Parle?

Vera Baird: I shall not advocate amendments Nos. 26 and 27, to which the hon. Member for Beaconsfield has already referred, even though they might have seemed like a good idea at the time. I address my brief remarks to amendments Nos. 2 and 78, which would make the person's knowing about the existence of the order insufficient for the breach to be made a crime, and which would make it criminal for him to breach the order only if he knew of its terms. I argue against that and suggest that the fact that he knows of its existence must be sufficient.
 There is the issue of ex parte around orders granted without someone being there to make his case. I will make the mistake of always saying ''her and him'', but much of it is about her and him, although there is domestic violence the other way. I hope that people will forgive me if I make that mistake. On an order obtained without notice, he will, none the less, be required under the terms of clause 1 to know that it existed, so it is not possible for him to commit the crime of breaking an order that he does not know exists. That is enough, for the following reasons. 
 People avoid service of domestic violence injunctions as often as they can, whenever they can and in whatever way they can. That is a hallmark. If someone knew that an order existed, but avoided service so that he did not know what had been outlawed, it would be inappropriate to allow that kind of conduct and give him a reasonable excuse for not breaking it. In a nutshell, if he knows of the order's existence, but does not know the terms, whose fault is that? If I knew that an order had been made against me in a county court, and I had any intention of complying with it, I would telephone and find out what it said, so that I would not breach it through error. The only way that people can decline to do that is if they do not have the slightest intention of observing its terms and are looking for a way out. Consequently, the amendments are a mistake. 
 There is also the tail-piece argument, which says that the order is capable of clouding the power of arrest if an officer says, ''You're under arrest because you're banging on the windows'', and the man is able to say, ''Well, I did not know that the order said that I could not do that, because I did not know its terms''. That would cloud the position for the constable. The point of the measure is surely to make it appropriate, right and almost automatic for the constable to arrest the person. There should not be scope for the opposite argument. I oppose amendments Nos. 2 and 78.

Paul Goggins: I shall concentrate most of my remarks on amendments Nos. 2 and 78, as hon. Members have argued effectively against the other two amendments.
 The Government's intention in framing clause 1 was to avoid one of the problems identified by many of those who responded to the ''Safety and Justice'' document on domestic violence: that respondents to without-notice orders often go to great lengths to avoid the service of that order so as to avoid compliance with it. Orders must be served in person, and by refusing to open the door to the person serving the notice, respondents can continue to harass the applicant, while all the time claiming truthfully that they have not been served with the order. That makes a mockery of such court orders, and we are taking action to deal with it. 
 The hon. Member for Beaconsfield and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Redcar discussed ex parte orders. In those cases, as my hon. and learned Friend said, one has to know about the existence of the order. An important aspect of ex parte orders is that a person will not be prosecuted for breaching an order when they do not know the order has been made. There is also the reasonable excuse defence, if someone is unable to find out about the terms of the order for some very good reason, such as disability, blindness or illiteracy. It remains the case that, as with all ex parte orders, the hearings must be held as soon as possible. 
 The issue that concentrated most members' minds was the balance between the civil and the criminal routes. I am happy to respond positively to the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome. As the Committee would expect, I stand foursquare with my noble Friend Baroness Scotland in that regard. Clearly one cannot be tried for the same offence in both courts, but we are certainly not trying to trump the civil route with the criminal route; both will remain open, for good reasons. My hon. and learned Friend commented in an intervention that the person protected by the order can have some degree of choice, dependent upon the circumstances she faces. It is also correct that, if the CPS and the police decide not to pursue a particular action by the criminal route, it would still be open to the person protected by the order to pursue the matter by the civil route.

Dominic Grieve: Will the victim, be it he or she, have that choice in reality? I assume the police will consult the victim, but is not one of the intended purposes to enable the police to take action themselves? Does this not raise the question of the guidelines and how they operate, and whether there will be CPS guidelines on the inter-relationship between civil and criminal proceedings? If there are to be such guidelines, and there probably ought to be, that is something the Minister might like to look into.

Paul Goggins: Great care will be taken to ensure that the person protected by the order is properly consulted and supported by all the agencies involved. It may well be that in most cases a decision is made to pursue the criminal route, with the full support of the person protected and the agencies concerned. I only make the
 point that if for any reason the police and CPS decide not to pursue that, it is still open for the person protected to go down the civil route.

Sally Keeble: I assume that the guidelines will be clear about the lengths to which the authorities have to go to ensure that a perpetrator knows about an ex parte order. I can imagine that some of the people who engage in that kind of activity do not sit around at home waiting for people to knock on their door, and might try to evade justice by claiming that they were not there, or that they had moved. Will it be absolutely clear to the authorities what steps they will have to take?

Paul Goggins: I assure my hon. Friend that the guidance will make that clear. I gave the most obvious example one might think of, somebody not opening the door, but I accept that others will be more sophisticated, and we will need to deal with different types of behaviour, to ensure that kind of non-compliance cannot be used as an excuse by the perpetrator.

David Heath: On the question of the twin court approach, I understand entirely that where the CPS or the police do not intend to take criminal proceedings, the victim has recourse to the civil courts. What I am not clear about is whether, in circumstances in which the CPS or the police intend to take criminal proceedings, the victim still has recourse to the civil courts. In normal circumstances, those proceedings would take place before criminal proceedings and would therefore pre-empt the action of the prosecution authorities, in which case we are back to square one: people can use the civil route to coerce others into avoiding criminal proceedings.

Paul Goggins: I shall reflect in a little more detail on the hon. Gentleman's remarks. The purpose of the provision is to empower the person who has been the victim. Clearly, that needs to be done in a spirit of collaboration with the agencies concerned. In leaving both routes open, we hope to give greater choice to the person who is protected. It may be that the agencies wish to pursue the criminal route and there are good reasons why the person being protected does not wish that to happen. The person being protected ought to be listened to during the deliberations and considerations. What matters is that there is protection and choice for the person concerned, because part of helping them to recover from the victimisation and abuse to which they have been subjected involves giving them greater power and control.
 The hon. Gentleman raised a point about whether we were moving towards an integrated court arrangement. We are looking to see how we can combine the two courts to hear both civil and criminal aspects of domestic violence. Indeed, a working group has already been established with the support of the president of the family division. We are taking care, 
 but we are certainly moving in that direction. Again, that is intended to help simplify matters and support the victim. 
 On the hon. Gentleman's question about the register of civil orders, we can do that in a non-statutory way; we do not need legislation. The most likely option is the police national computer. The Home Office is working on a practical solution to ensure that that can happen. We certainly intend to make progress in that area.

Cheryl Gillan: On the serving of the order, obviously we have moved on from people shutting the door in the face of the server, and other methods of serving orders can be used. There has been some discussion recently about whether e-mails and text messages would satisfy the requirements of serving an order. Has the Minister any further and better particulars on that?

Paul Goggins: I have not, but I shall make some inquiries, because clearly those are modern systems of communication and could be used. The key thing is always acknowledging the receipt of the information. We have already had some discussion about e-mails this morning, which may or may not be pertinent to this discussion. I shall certainly take a closer look at the matter.

Vera Baird: I am probably being very stupid about the dual route issue, but I wonder whether it could be clarified. In fact, there is a triple route, and I want to ensure that all three routes survive. First, there is the current position: someone can go to the county court and get a non-molestation order backed by a power of arrest. That is route A. If the person concerned is arrested, he is taken to the county court the following morning. Route B is that, irrespective of whether there is a power of arrest on the original order, the person is arrested under clause 1 for the criminal offence of breaking the order and is then taken to the magistrates court at some point in the future. Route C is when the person being protected has a non-molestation order, but it does not have a power of arrest attached to it, so on the following day she has to go to the county court and issue a warrant for the other person's arrest. I am sure that that route will survive. What I am interested in knowing is whether we are absolutely clear that routes A and B will survive. Both those routes make an immediate arrest available, although the person would logically go to two different courts in the two scenarios.

Paul Goggins: I confirm to my hon. and learned Friend, whom I have never found to be stupid in her assessments and remarks, that she is right about options A and B, but not about option C. The twin-track approach that we are adopting will use options A and B.
 I will not labour my points on amendments Nos. 17 and 26. As I said, others have commented. I simply say that our proposal is that, if the court is considering an occupation order, we will—through this legislation—ensure that it also considers the making of a non-molestation order. The amendments would mean that, if the court was considering an occupation order, it 
 must make a non-molestation order, but only in the most serious cases. Clearly that would constrain the powers of the court. We do not wish to do that, but wish to give the court flexibility to take the appropriate action in all circumstances. We believe that the amendments would fetter them unnecessarily.

Dominic Grieve: This has been an interesting debate. While I appreciate the theory of the maintenance of the twin-track approach, I cannot help but think that, in reality, civil jurisdiction and enforcement is largely going to disappear.
 Consider the example of a non-molestation order with a power of arrest attached. It is breached and the police arrive. They take the individual concerned, be it he or she, to the police station. It is true that they could bring that person before the country court the following morning. On the other hand, they could charge that person then and there and bring them before the magistrates court the following morning. 
 Something in my mind suggests that, once a criminal sanction exists, it is more likely to be used than a civil sanction, especially when placed in the hands of a criminal law enforcement authority. I just want the Government to think about the issue, because I have the feeling that, in reality, the civil jurisdiction route is going to die. Indeed, one of the unintended consequences may be that far fewer non-molestation orders have powers of arrest attached to them, because it will not be necessary any more. 
 So, I would have thought that, over time, the power of arrest attached to a non-molestation order is going to vanish. It is simply going to be a non-molestation order, and breaching that is a police matter. The county court will disappear from the picture 
 completely. As I said earlier, I have anxieties about that because the county court tries to take, to use a word much abused in the House—I try to refrain from using it, but for once I cannot think of a better word—an holistic approach to family matters. It tries to square circles and smooth difficulties, rather than visiting penal sanctions on individuals. 
 That is desirable, because of the context in which family jurisdiction so often has to be invoked. One of the consequences of the changes will be that we move towards a much more mechanistic system and that, once the order has been made, that is it and the individual is in a criminal jurisdiction. I may be wrong, but I think that that is something that the Government should think about. 
 I do not think that there is necessarily an easy solution, unless the Government decide, through the mechanism of the CPS, to publish guidelines to try to identify which category of case ought to go to the magistrates court and which ought to return to the judge. Of course, there is a risk attached to that, which is that going down that road may undermine one of the purposes of the legislation. 
 I accept the criticisms that have been made by the Minister and others on the first two amendments in the group. It remains the case that my personal experience is that it is astonishing how often one has to repeat to people what an order is before they understand it. How often have I sat in court and listened to the judge covering the same ground again and again, saying, ''This means X'', yet, two weeks later, the person has still failed to understand? 
It being twenty-five minutes past Eleven o'clock, The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put, pursuant to the Standing Order. 
 Adjourned till this day at half-past Two o'clock.